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SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 71 
OF THE CISG ON SUSPENSION DUE TO PROSPECTIVE 
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT EXPECTATIONS 
William Lawrence* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between the time of contract formation and the time for contract 
performance, a variety of communications or events might give one of the 
party’s real concerns about whether the other party will be able or willing to 
fulfill its future contract performance obligations. These concerns 
prospectively impair, to varying degrees, the legitimate contract expectations 
of the concerned party. That party can now find itself in a position of 
insecurity that it would not have assumed if the concerns had been known 
before entering the contract. 
The United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods 
(CISG) addresses this situation in Chapter 5 of Part III on provisions common 
to the obligations of both sellers and buyers.1 It allows an aggrieved party to 
take specified actions prior to a breach, with the objective of enabling that 
party to initiate action to address the impairment.2 One of the options is the 
Article 71 right of the aggrieved party to suspend performance that has 
become due on its part (e.g., making an advance payment) to see if the 
                                                                                                                           
 
* The author would like to acknowledge and thank the following persons for their valuable 
assistance: Professors Herbert Lazerow and David Brennan, University of San Diego School of Law; 
Mary Jean Del Campo; and the Legal Research Center at the University of San Diego, particularly Sasha 
Nunez. 
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods pt. III, ch. 5, § 1, 
Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
2 Id. 
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impairment can be resolved before proceeding.3 The more drastic action is 
for the aggrieved party to avoid (cancel) the contract under Article 72.4 
This Paper analyzes the treatment of the remedies of suspension and 
avoidance under the CISG. Although Article 72 treatment of avoidance is on 
solid footing, the approach to suspension in Article 71 leaves a great deal to 
be desired. Without question, the availability of suspension can be an 
effective remedy. However, in my opinion, which is contrary to the stated 
positions of nearly all other commentators that have addressed the issue, 
Article 71 undercuts the suspension remedy so severely as to question 
whether it has any real distinction from the Article 72 requirements on 
avoidance. 
II. CISG PROVISIONS ON AVOIDANCE AND SUSPENSION 
A. Avoidance: Article 72 
The CISG statement granting the right to invoke avoidance is 
straightforward: “If prior to the date for performance of the contract, it is 
clear that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, 
the other party may declare the contract avoided.”5 Thus, in appropriate 
cases, an aggrieved party is not required to wait until such an impairment 
ripens into a present breach in order to avoid the contract.6 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 Id. art.71. 
4 Id. art. 72. Article 73 also provides for avoidance in the context of instalment contracts—both 
avoidance of an individual instalment and avoidance of the remainder of the contract following a breach 
by a party on a single instalment. Because the second of these two categories involves avoidance with 
respect to all future deliveries, the less drastic remedy of suspension is also available to aggrieved parties. 
Several decisions recognize that, in an instalment contract, the aggrieved party might act under either 
article [71 or 73] as to future instalments. UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 30 J.L. & COM. (Special Issue) 1, 339 (2012) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Digest]. 
5 “Article 72 offers protection against a future breach of contract.” PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, 
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (CISG) 532–33 (2d 
ed. 1998) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY 2d]. 
6 Mercédeh Azeredo da Silveira, Anticipatory Breach under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2005 NORDIC J. COM. L. 2005(2) at 2 (“without the need 
to wait until the breach materializes on the date when performance is due”); Trevor Bennett, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 526 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonnell eds., 1987) 
(“should not have to wait until the date fixed for performance has elapsed”); Sieg Eiselen, Remarks on the 
Manner in Which the Principles of European Contract Law May Be Used to Interpret or Supplement 
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Because the fundamental breach standard is imposed for avoidance even 
in cases of present breach,7 the use of the same standard in Article 72 on 
anticipatory breach is not surprising. In either instance, the right of avoidance 
is predicated on the establishment of a fundamental breach by the other 
party.8 Article 25 states the applicable standard: “A breach of contract 
committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment 
to the other party as to substantially deprive him of what he is entitled to 
expect under the contract . . . .”9 The right of an aggrieved party to cancel the 
contract for a present or a prospective breach is not taken lightly.10 
Although Articles 49(1)(a) and 64(1)(a) on present breach and Article 
72(1) on anticipatory breach state the required showing of fundamental 
                                                                                                                           
 
Articles 71 and 72 of the CISG, in GUIDE TO ARTICLES 71 AND 72 (Sept. 2002) (“without having to wait 
until performance become due”); Ulrich Magnus, The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract Under CISG—
General Remarks and Special Cases, 25 J.L. & COM. 423, 424–25 (2006) (“If a fundamental breach has 
occurred, the immediate right to terminate the contract accrues and may be immediately exercised by the 
aggrieved party in the form and within the period required by the CISG.”); Peter Schlechtriem, 
Calculation of Damages in the Event of Anticipatory Breach under the CISG, PACE-IICL CISG 
DATABASE, cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem20.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2008) 
[hereinafter Schlechtreim, Calculation of Damages] (“need not wait until the breach actually occurs”). 
7 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(a); CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(a). 
8 In addition to fundamental breach as a means to qualify for avoidance, the CISG articles on present 
breach also give a right to avoid in relation to a Nachfrist notice. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b); 
CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(b). Articles 47 and 63 present this remedy, which is reflective of German 
law, in allowing aggrieved buyers and sellers, respectively, to fix an additional reasonable time for 
performance by the breaching party. If a breaching seller then does not deliver the goods within the fixed 
time, Article 49(1)(b) gives the buyer the right to avoid the contract in Article 49(1)(b). If a breaching 
buyer does not perform its obligations of taking the goods or paying the price within the designated time, 
Article 64(1)(b) allows the seller to declare the contract avoided. Due to the prospective nature of 
anticipatory repudiation, this type of notice is not relevant to Article 72. In these cases an aggrieved party 
can avoid only when a forthcoming fundamental breach is clear. 
9 Article 25 concludes with an exception for cases that otherwise fall within the basic standard: 
“. . . unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.” CISG supra note 1, art. 25. Damages, of course, 
are available as a remedy in any case of breach, whether or not fundamental. 
10 Oberlandesgericht [OLG Köln] [Higher Regional Court] Oct. 14, 2002, INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 15 (2003) (Ger.); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 94 (1986) (“a remedy of last 
resort”) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION]; Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 23 
(“[A]voidance of the contract under the CISG is clearly a remedy of extrema ratio.”); Anna Kazimierska, 
The Remedy of Avoidance under the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, in REVIEW 
OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1999–2000, 150 
(2001) (“last resort remedies, due to the drastic effects, which result from their exercise”); Magnus, supra 
note 6, at 424 (“[A]voidance under the CISG is a remedy of last resort, or an ultima ratio remedy, which 
should not be granted easily.”). 
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breach differently, the differences really only reflect the respective time 
perspectives involved.11 Under Articles 49(1)(a) and 64(1)(a), only a failure 
by a breaching party that already “amounts to a fundamental breach” can 
qualify, whereas Article 72(1) requires that it be “clear that one of the parties 
will commit a fundamental breach.”12 
With respect to present breach, the most difficult cases to analyze are 
those in which the breaching party has performed but fallen short of 
completing all of its contractual obligations. The detriment to the aggrieved 
party must be identified and a determination must be made as to whether that 
detriment substantially deprives the aggrieved party of its contractual 
expectation.13 The aggrieved party must be cautious in making these 
determinations, because if it decides wrongly that the breach is fundamental 
and avoids the contract, it will itself become the aggressor and commit a 
breach by avoiding the contract without the right to take that course of 
action.14 By comparison, the easiest cases for finding a fundamental present 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(a); CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(a); CISG, supra note 1, art. 
72(1). 
12 See CISG, supra note 1, at art. 49(1)(a); CISG, supra note 1, at art. 64(1)(a); CISG, supra note 
1, at art. 72(1) (emphases added). See also CHENGWEI LIU, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SALES: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM CISG, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND PECL 297 (Marie Stefanini Newman ed., 2007) 
(“CISG Art. 72 applies only where future performance is still due.”) (emphasis added). 
13 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25. 
14 The observation also applies in the context of anticipatory repudiation under Article 72. See 
Bennett, supra note 6, at 528 (“[H]is action may be invalid and lead to the result that his own subsequent 
non-performance amounts to a breach and possibility for damages.”); FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH 
MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS: COMMENTARY 290 (1992) (“If a party declares the contract avoided without a 
fundamental breach of contract by the other party being anticipated, the former commits a fundamental 
breach of contract.”); JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 437 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d], https:// 
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html (“A’s wrongful declaration of avoidance may constitute a 
repudiation giving B the right to avoid the contract under Article 72(1).”); Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CONTRACTS 1, 149 (J. Herbots & R. Blanplain eds.) (Supp. 2000), http://www 
.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky.html#p149 (“[A] party who fails to perform by virtue of an 
avoidance not justified under article 72 will itself commit a (perhaps fundamental) breach.”). See also 
Shuttle Packaging Sys. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 WL 34046276 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) 
(buyer that avoided a contract on which the seller did not commit a fundamental breach, committed a 
fundamental breach itself); Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 
4852314 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013) (buyer that repudiated the contract by wrongfully sending a notice of 
cancellation fundamentally breached the contract). 
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breach occur when the breaching party has not provided any performance, 
and has not shown any inclination to cure its breach. A complete deprivation 
of everything that the aggrieved party was entitled to receive is the most 
obvious form of a fundamental breach. 
Article 72(1) is the same, except that the impairment is prospective. The 
breach, having not yet occurred, must be measured for its prospective impact. 
It must be clear that a fundamental breach will occur. This clarity is the most 
obvious when one party, in advance of its time for performance, states 
definitively that it will not perform at all.15 The deprivation of entitlement 
under the contract then is total. In the absence of a sufficient statement, the 
only other basis to be clear that a fundamental breach will occur is for actions 
to be taken that will preclude performance by one party, such as the 
bankruptcy of a buyer or a seller wrongfully selling unique goods to a third 
buyer.16 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBOR SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION 
ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 971 (3d ed. 2010) (“A definite refusal to perform is 
considered as a stronger indication for the breakdown of the contract.”) [hereinafter SCHLECHTRIEM & 
SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d]; Magellan Int’l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 
921 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (seller stated it would “no longer feel obligated” to perform and would “sell the 
material elsewhere”); Guangdong AAA New Technology Co. v. CCC S.A. (China v. Switz.), Chinese 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) (Oct. 2007), https://cisgw3.law 
.pace.edu/cases/071000c1.html; Epheteia Lamia [Ephet.] [Court of Appeals] 63/2006 (Greece) (seller 
refused to deliver sunflower seeds because the market had changed); Schiedsgericht Hamburger 
Freundschaftliche Arbitrage [Arbitral Tribunal] Dec. 29, 1998, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSHRIFT-
RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT ZIVILRECHT (NJW-RR) 780, 1999, CLOUT No. 293 (Ger.) (demands 
exceeding agreed upon terms made as a condition for delivery). 
16 Secretariat Commentary No. 2 on Article 63 of the 1978 Draft [counterpart of CISG Article 72], 
JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 433 (3d 
ed. 1989) [hereinafter HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (“The future fundamental breach may be 
clear either because of the words or actions of the party which constitute a repudiation of the contract or 
because of an objective fact, such as the destruction of the seller’s plant by fire or the imposition of an 
embargo or monetary controls which will render impossible future performance.”). See also ENDERLEIN 
& MASKOW, supra note 14, at 290 (“Art. 72 thus combines in one rule the refusal to perform and an 
anticipated objective impossibility to perform.”). 
“The preconditions of paragraph (1) [of Section 72—clear fundamental breach] were found to have 
been satisfied in the following circumstances in regard to the buyer: the buyer failed to pay for prior 
shipments; the buyer failed to open a letter of credit; the buyer failed to open a conforming letter of credit; 
the buyer had failed to pay for a consignment and failed to provide an adequate assurance of 
performance. . . . [Comparably] in regard to the seller: the seller failed to reduce the price and to commit 
to deliver fashion goods on time; the seller deliberately terminated delivery of the goods; the seller refused 
to give effect to a requirement that a whole ship be chartered exclusively for the transport of the goods; 
the seller refused to commit to a date for delivery and advised the buyer to purchase substitute goods; the 
seller declared that it was impossible to find the goods and the possibility of finding replacement goods 
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Cases of anticipatory repudiation that fall somewhat short of these 
bright-line tests can pose the same issue that arises under present breach 
when the breach is only partial. Suppose, for example, that prior to the time 
set for performance, one of the parties repudiates only part of its contractual 
obligations or insists upon some unilateral modification of a term of the 
contract as a condition to its willingness to perform under the contract. As 
with a comparable present partial breach, the detriment to the aggrieved party 
must be identified and a determination must be made as to whether that 
detriment would substantially deprive the aggrieved party of the contractual 
expectation to which it is entitled. 
B. Suspension: Article 71 
With such a high standard required to avoid a contract prospectively 
under Article 72, many parties in international sales contracts will seek an 
alternative remedy when they are not certain of (but nevertheless have serious 
reservations about) the other party’s willingness or ability to perform. 
Suspension becomes attractive because it allows the aggrieved party to 
withhold further performance on its part, while seeing whether the other party 
will remove the impairment. If not, the other party will breach, and 
suspension will have allowed the aggrieved party not to have incurred any 
further expenses in its own performance. Article 71(1) purports to provide 
such a remedy. It states, in part, that “[a] party may suspend the performance 
of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent 
that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his 
obligations . . . .”17 
                                                                                                                           
 
was low; the seller provided flawed sketches for the manufacturing of the goods and provided no adequate 
assurance of improving them in time.” UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 4, at 336. 
17 CISG, supra note 1. Article 71(1) continues as follows: 
“as a result of: 
(a) a serious deficiency in the ability to perform or in his creditworthiness; or 
(b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing the contract.”). 
As noted, scholars have previously indicated that “[t]he various grounds for endangerment which 
give rise to the right of suspension are described in such wide terms as to cover virtually all sorts of 
disturbance.” SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 951. For this reason, 
these subsections are not further analyzed. 
See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], July 17, 2007, 4C.94/2006 (Switz.) (party that 
cannot satisfy the criteria of Article 71, but who nonetheless suspends its performance, will breach the 
contract by failing to go forward in meeting its contract obligations). 
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As the discussion below explains, the remedy provided in Article 71(1) 
is largely illusory. The problem is that the drafting for the remedy of 
suspension limits its availability to circumstances that are equivalent to (or 
at least closely resemble) the restraints in Article 72 on the remedy of 
avoidance. The basic premise advanced in this Paper is that the CISG is far 
too constrained in permitting the remedy of suspension. 
C. Comparing Availability of Suspension and Avoidance 
A quick reading of Articles 71 and 72 would certainly lead to the 
conclusion that the two articles state quite different requirements for 
suspension and avoidance. A reader familiar with Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) would likely draw the conclusion that the two 
provisions create remedies that correlate to U.C.C. Sections 2-609 and 2-
610.18 The impression of distinctive requirements is enhanced by the 
separation of the two concepts into two distinct articles in the CISG and by 
the use of different language in both articles.19 
Article 71 on suspension restricts the remedy to circumstances in which 
“it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part 
of his obligations,” whereas Article 72 on avoidance allows for the remedy 
in circumstances in which “it is clear that one of the parties will commit a 
fundamental breach of contract.”20 These statements of the prerequisites for 
availability of the respective remedies both include two distinct elements. 
The distinctions in the drafting of the two articles center on the phrases 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Professor Farnsworth, one of the U.S. delegates to the Vienna Conference, reportedly claimed 
that U.C.C. Section 2-609 had inspired Article 71. See Tatsiana Seliazniova, Prospective Non-
Performance or Anticipatory Breach of Contract (Comparison of the Belarusian Approach to CISG 
Application and Foreign Legal Experience), 24 J.L. & COM. 111, 128 (2004) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, 
The Vienna Convention: An International Law for the Sale of Goods, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 121, 135 (Martha L. Landweher ed., 1983)). Be that as it may, the subsequent 
discussion in the text of this Article will show that the drafting of Article 71 limits the availability for 
suspension far more that U.C.C. Section 2-609 does. See infra notes 68–96 and accompanying text. 
19 Several commentators draw upon this separation and the language differences as support of their 
argument that the drafters must have intended different standards. See infra notes 36, 46, & 64 and 
accompanying text. 
20 CISG, supra note 1, art. 71 & 72. 
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“becomes apparent” versus “it is clear” as well as a “substantial part of his 
obligations” versus “fundamental breach of contract.”21 
With respect to the “becomes apparent” versus “it is clear” standards, 
both of them are prospective, as they concern something indicating that a 
breach will occur in the future. The focus here is on the required degree of 
certainty that the anticipated breach will occur. Both standards force the 
aggrieved party to predict that under the current circumstances a breach will 
occur.22 The additional elements of “substantial part” vs. “fundamental 
breach” are also prospective: they both concern a breach that will occur in 
the future. The focus of those elements is on the extent of the impairment of 
the other party’s interests that the expected breach will impose. 
1. “Becomes Apparent” vs. “It is Clear” 
The difference between clear and apparent is neither clear nor apparent. 
Something is clear when it is “unmistakable,” “free from doubt,” and 
synonymous with “absolute” or “evident”;23 it is apparent when it is “clear 
or manifest to the understanding.”24 “Apparent” could also suggest 
something “not actually being what appearance indicates.”25 Most of the 
distinction between “apparent” and “clear” dissolves, however, upon 
recognition that the degree of clarity required in Article 72 is not absolute.26 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Compare CISG, supra note 1, art. 71, with CISG, supra note 1, art. 72. 
22 HENRY GABRIEL, CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2d ed. 2009) (“Both articles are concerned with predicting whether there will 
be a breach.”); LIU, supra note 12, at 268 (“concerned with predicting”); INGEBORG SCHWENZER, 
CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS & MARIEL DIMSEY, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GUIDE TO THE CISG 
508, 518–19 (2012) (explaining that Article 71(1) “requires a prediction” and “[l]ike Article 71(1) CISG, 
it [Article 72] requires a prediction”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 522 (“predict that a non-performance is 
likely to occur”); Seliazniova, supra note 18, at 126 (“hypothetical future breach situation”). 
23 Clear, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11 ed. 2013). 
24 Apparent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11 ed. 2013) (The dictionary also 
uses both “apparent” and “clear” as synonyms of “evident,” which it defines as “clear to the vision or 
understanding.”). 
25 Id. 
26 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 291 (“There need not, however, be absolute 
certainty.”); FRANCO FERRARI & MARCO TORSELLO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW—CISG IN A 
NUTSHELL 457–58 (2d ed. 2018) (“Article 72 CISG does not require absolute certainty that a breach will 
be committed.”); GABRIEL, supra note 22, at 216 (“The standard to invoke the rule appears to be that there 
is a very high probability that there will be a fundamental breach rather than complete certainty.”); 
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 437 (“even though such a declaration [repudiation] does 
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The bright-line tests of renunciation of contract obligations, or of actions that 
make subsequent performance impossible, provide the degree of certainty 
required in order to invoke avoidance.27 Because the time for contract 
performance in Article 72 is in the future, the offending party conceivably 
might become willing and able to perform by that time. For example, he 
might retract his repudiation, reacquire the unique goods of the contract from 
persons to whom they were wrongfully sold, or overcome the obstacles of 
bankruptcy.28 Absolute pre-breach certainty would be an unworkable 
standard. Instead, we have bright-line tests from which we are willing to infer 
sufficient certainty. Consequently, use of the term “clear” in Article 72 does 
not mean the complete certainty that the term suggests. 
                                                                                                                           
 
not make it absolutely ‘clear’ . . . .”); Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 24–25 (“[A]rt. 72 does not 
require absolute and unshakable certainty that a breach will be committed.”); Kazimierska, supra note 10, 
at 97 (“not required to be absolutely certain”); LIU, supra note 12, at 284 (“no absolute certainty is 
required”); Djakhongir Saidov, Anticipatory Breach and Instalment Contracts—Articles 71–73, in UN 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 922 (Stefan Kröll, Loukas A 
Mistelis & Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2d ed. 2018) (“[It] is a probability standard and 
therefore absolute certainty in prognosis is not required.”); M. Gilbey Strub, The Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods: Anticipatory Repudiation Provisions and Developing Countries, 38 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 475, 493, 498 (1989) (“need not establish non-performance with absolute certainty”) (“[I]f a 
party’s declared refusal fails to make non-performance absolutely ‘clear,’ a party’s demand for additional 
or varying terms can hardly be considered to make non-performance ‘clear’ either.”). See Downs 
Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Perwaja Steel SDN BHD [2000] QSC 421 (Austl.); P. v. P., Case No. S2/97, 
SCHIEDSGERICHT DER BÖRSE FUR LANDWIRTSCHAFTLICHE PRODUKTE [Arbital Tribunal-Wien] Oct. 12, 
1997, http://www.unilex.info/cisg/case/346; LANDGERICHT [LG Berlin] [Regional Court], Sept. 30, 1992, 
99 O 123/92, http://www.unilex.info/cisg/case/79 (discussing avoidance in stating that “[t]he court held 
that the probability of a future breach of contract has to be very high and obvious to everybody, but did 
not require almost complete certainty”). But see Jelena Vilus, Provisions Common to the Obligations of 
the Seller and the Buyer, in INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 244 (Petar 
Šarčević & Paul Volken eds., 1986) (“The party intending to declare the contract avoided must be 
absolutely sure that there is indeed a fundamental breach of contract.”). 
27 The bright-line tests for avoidance are a repudiation by the other party or actions that make that 
party’s future performance impossible. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
28 SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 95 (“Moreover, another reason for not 
requiring a higher degree of certainty under Article 71(1) is that otherwise, a serious refusal to perform 
would never be ‘certain’ enough under Article 72(3) since an obligor can always change his intentions 
until the time for performance.”). For discussion of Article 72(3), see note 74 infra. See also HONNOLD, 
UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 429 (“[C]ircumstances that make it ‘apparent’ that the other party 
will not perform need not establish a certainty of non-performance since the initial appearance may be 
modified by clarification of the situation or by the removal of the initial barriers to performance.”). 
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The UNICITRAL draft of Article 71 presented to the delegates at the 
Vienna Convention29 allowed an aggrieved party to suspend its performance 
when it had “good grounds to conclude that the other party will not perform 
a substantial part of his obligations.”30 Some of the delegates, primarily from 
developing nations, voiced concerns that under the provision as drafted, 
suspension could be based too much on the aggrieved party’s subjective 
assessment of the other party’s ability or willingness to perform.31 The 
wording ultimately was changed to “it becomes apparent” in an effort to 
apply a more objective standard.32 
As the discussion below demonstrates,33 in turning to the requirement 
of “apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his 
obligations,” the delegates pushed the required showing for suspension into 
a standard comparable to the “becomes clear” standard for avoidance. 
Most commentators addressing the issue disagree with that last 
statement.34 They nearly unanimously contend that the degree of certainty 
required under Article 71 is less than the standard for avoidance.35 This 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 For a compilation of studies, deliberations, and decisions that led to the CISG, see HONNOLD, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16. For a good summation of the process leading to Article 71 and 
72, see Bennett, supra note 6, at 513–18. 
30 Anticipatory Breach and Installment Contracts: Article 62(1), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 16, at 389. 
31 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 428. 
32 Id. Due to the prospective nature of the suspension and avoidance remedies, the aggrieved party 
has to predict that the anticipated breach will occur. Several commentators have pointed out that, even 
though Article 71 requires the use of an objective standard to govern the prediction, the process inevitably 
involves the inclusion of subjective reasoning. See, e.g., Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 5 (“The 
party seeking suspension is frequently incapable of assessing precisely the probability that a non-
performance will occur, but he is merely in a position to assert, based on a party-subjective appreciation 
of the circumstances, that it is likely that such non-performance will occur.”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 
514 (“[A]s the article makes provision for situations in which breaches of contract are anticipated only, 
its operation will inevitably involve some subjective assessment on the part of a suspending party.”); 
Seliazniova, supra note 18, at 126 (“The party will estimate the ensuing events on the basis of his 
subjective view influenced by an objective test.”). Because Article 72 also requires an assessment of what 
is likely, the same observation about the role of subjective influence applies there as well: The interests 
of the suspending party “are mainly defined subjectively by the party itself. But the seriousness of the 
infringement, the fundamentality of the breach, is determined objectively.” Magnus, supra note 6, at 436. 
33 See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
34 “[T]he majority of authors who have examined the question have come to the conclusion that 
‘standards for suspension are less rigorous than the standards for avoidance under article 72.’” Azeredo 
da Silveira, supra note 6, at 21 (quoting HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 430). 
35 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 286 (“[T]he standards of Article 71 are less strict than 
those of Article 72.”); FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 26, at 457 (“It is apparent that the degree of 
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conclusion is influenced largely by the separation of the standards into two 
different articles in the CISG in which each standard is stated differently, and 
assuming therefore that the drafters must have intended some difference.36 
Their argument is further supported by the statement of the respective 
standards in the French version of the CISG. The French text uses the term il 
apparait (said to be the same as il est etabil), whereas it uses stronger 
language of il est manifeste in Article 72.37 
                                                                                                                           
 
certainty required for the application of Article 72 CISG is higher than that required under Article 71 
CISG.”); GABRIEL, supra note 22, at 217 (“[R]equirements for avoidance under Article 72 are more 
stringent . . . .”); HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 437 (“[S]tandards for suspension are 
less rigorous than the standards for avoidance under Article 72.”); LIU, supra note 12, at 268 (“[T]he 
preconditions for the more drastic remedy of avoidance are more stringent . . . .”); Azeredo da Silveira, 
supra note 6, at 5–6 (“[T]he degree of certainty that a breach will be committed, required under art. 71 
CISG, is lower than the degree of certainty required under art. 72 CISG . . . .”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 
528 (Avoidance requires “a greater certainty than is required for the application of Article 71.”); Eiselen, 
supra note 6, at 3 (“Article 72 requires a higher standard of prospective certainty . . . .”); Harry M. 
Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of 
the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53, 94 (1988) (“As could be expected, suspension under Article 71 requires 
less certainty concerning a future breach than does avoidance under Article 72.”) [hereinafter Flechtner, 
Remedies]; Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 147 (“somewhat easier to suspend than avoid”); Keith A. 
Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 565, 
634 (2001) (“less certainty”); Seliazniova, supra note 18, at 128 (“less certainty”); Strub, supra note 26, 
at 494 (“less stringent”); Yinghao Yang, Suspension Rules Under Chinese Contract Law, the UCC and 
the CISG: Some Comparative Perspectives, PACE-IICL CISG DATABASE, www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/yang.html (last updated Oct. 12, 2004) (“lower degree of certainty than contract avoidance”). 
In some of his earliest work, Professor Schlechtriem did not see any difference between the two 
standards. SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 95 (“In my opinion, the different 
formulations do not require different degrees of certainty—such a requirement would hardly be 
practicable anyway.”). For his more recent opinion, see infra note 36. See also Saidov, supra note 26, at 
892–93 (“Although such a distinction may be possible in theory, it is doubtful whether it is workable in 
practice.”). 
36 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 428 (The conference “took pains to preserve 
different language authorizing these different remedies.”); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN 
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL SALES 185 (2009) (explaining that the Article 71(1) threshold is “not as high as 
for an anticipatory breach under Article 72(1) CISG”); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 
3d, supra note 15, at 954 (“[T]he threshold in Article 71 is lower . . . . Otherwise, Article 72, which allows 
for avoidance of the contract in cases of fundamental anticipatory breach, would be redundant.”); Azeredo 
da Silveira, supra note 6, at 18 (“These distinctions in terminology convey substantive differences 
between the two provisions.”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 522 (“This different wording was deliberately 
adopted by the Vienna Conference on the basis that . . . a difference of meaning was involved.”). 
37 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 428 n.4 (“See also the other official language 
versions: in French ‘il apparait’ (Art. 71) v. ‘il est manifeste’ (Art. 72); in Spanish ‘manifesto’ (Art. 71) 
v. ‘patente’ (Art. 72).”); Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 21 (“The difference in terminology was . . . 
consciously drafted and is also found in the French and Spanish versions of the CISG.”); Bennett, supra 
note 6, at 522 (“This different wording was deliberately adopted by the Vienna Convention on the basis 
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Even if one concedes that the drafters intended a difference, the question 
concerning the extent of the difference remains. Most writers have described 
Article 71 as requiring “virtual certainty” or “substantial probability,”38 or 
have indicated that, compared with the requirement of “clear” in Article 72, 
the Article 71 standard is “somewhat easier” or “a slightly lesser 
probability.”39 These academic descriptions demonstrate that the difference 
between “becomes apparent” and “it is clear” is close to de minimus.40 
Sometimes, commentators have hedged their statements about the different 
                                                                                                                           
 
that, at least in the French text, a difference of meaning was involved.”); Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 147 
(states that the French terms are “il apparait” (Art. 71) vs. “une partie essentielle” (Art. 72)). 
38 LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG 
JURISPRUDENCE 124 (2005) (“narrowness of the preconditions for suspension of performance”); 
ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 285 (“high degree of probability of non-performance”); 
FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 26, at 452 (“[T]he prevailing view requires that the likelihood of a 
breach amount to a virtual certainty by normal business standards.”); HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra 
note 14, at 429 (“substantial probability of non-performance”); SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY 2d, supra 
note 5, at 533 (“high degree of probability”); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra 
note 15, at 957–58 (“Although virtual certainty cannot be required, a high degree of probability is essential 
in order to prevent the creditor relying on Article 71 based on rash allegations.”); Azeredo da Silveira, 
supra note 6, at 4 (“substantial probability”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 522 (“Strictly construed, the 
language of the article seems to require that the likelihood of the apprehended non-performance amount 
to a virtual certainty by normal business standards.”); Eiselen, supra note 6, at 3 (“very high degree of 
probability”); Robert Koch, The Concept of Fundamental Breach of Contract under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 305 (1999) [ed. Pace] (“high degree of probability”); 
Saidov, supra note 26, at 895 (“requiring a ‘high’ or ‘substantial’ degree of likelihood”) (footnotes 
omitted); Strub, supra note 26, at 494 (“a high degree of probability of non-performance”). See also 
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 12, 1998, 2Ob328/97t, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/ 
Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_19980212_OGH0002_0020OB00328_97T0000_000/JJT_19980212_OGH0002_
0020OB00328_97T0000_000.pdf (Austria) (high probability of breach) [hereinafter OGH 2Ob328/97t]; 
LANDGERICHT BERLIN [LG Berlin] [Regional Court], Sept. 30, 1992, 99 O 123/92, http://www.unilex 
.info/cisg/case/79 (Ger.) (obvious to everybody). 
39 LIU, supra note 12, at 269 (“somewhat easier to suspend than avoid”); Lookofsky, supra note 
14, at 147 (“a slightly lesser probability than one which is ‘clear’”). 
40 Seliazniova, supra note 18, at 128 (“[I]t is necessary to emphasize that the barrier between the 
standard of ‘apparency,’ used in Article 71, and ‘clearness,’ determining the right to declare a contract 
avoided, is very fragile.”). Some decisions based on Article 71 have set exceedingly high requirements in 
determining that the aggrieved party could not suspend. See, e.g., OGH 2Ob328/97t, supra note 38 
(explaining that Article 71 was not available even though the buyer did not pay and cancelled a bank 
payment order that it showed the seller); Hof Leeuwarden 31 augustus 2005, 0400549 (Auto-Moto 
S.R.O/Pedro Boat B.V.) (Neth.) (discussing how the buyer could not suspend its payment obligation, even 
though the seller breached in not passing title to the goods and, although title passed in the meantime, 
damages for the delay could not be assured). 
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standards with terms like “arguably” and “likely.”41 None of the 
commentators have suggested that a substantial difference in the degree of 
required certainty separates the two articles. This analysis thus shows that, 
despite the general conclusion that Article 72 requires a higher showing of 
probability of breach, the same commentators themselves agree through their 
explanations that the extent of the difference with the Article 71 requirement 
is instead incredibly narrow. 
2. “Substantial Part” vs. “Fundamental Breach” 
Article 71 on suspension restricts the remedy to circumstances in which 
“it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part 
of his obligations,”42 whereas Article 72 on avoidance requires that “it is clear 
that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract.”43 Thus, 
in addition to addressing the degree of certainty required in order to invoke 
either remedy, an adequate showing must also address the extent of the 
prospective impairment. 
Although not discussed as extensively by the commentators as 
“apparent” versus “clear,” the nearly unanimous consensus is that Article 72 
on avoidance requires more: the breach has to be more serious for avoidance 
as compared to suspension.44 Here again the commentators sometimes use 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 LIU, supra note 12, at 269 (“Art. 72 arguably requires ‘a greater certainty’”); Azeredo da Silveira, 
supra note 6, at 18 (“seem to differ”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 528 (“It requires that it be clear that the 
breach will be committed, and in this respect arguably requires a greater certainty than is required for the 
application of Article 71.”); Eiselen, supra note 6, at 3 (“seems to be”); Flechtner, Remedies, supra note 
35, at 94 (“appears that”); Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 147 (“presumably intended”); Strub, supra note 
26, at 494 (“must be assumed”); Yang, supra note 35, at 6 (“[a]rguably lower degree of certainty than 
contract avoidance”). Another authority states succinctly the tenuous nature of this assessment: “Note, for 
example, that different language, and a presumably higher burden to the party taking advantage of 
anticipatory breach, is used in Article 72, thus leading the observer to conclude that ‘becomes apparent’ 
is somehow different from the rather restrictive clarity that is required in Article 72.” Mark S. Walter, 
Drafting Contracts to Deal with Insecurity and Prospective Breach (Articles 71, 72, 73(2)), in DRAFTING 
CONTRACTS UNDER THE CISG 413, 419 (Harry M. Flechtner, Ronald A. Brand & Mark S. Walter eds., 
2008). 
42 CISG, supra note 1, art. 71. 
43 Id. art. 72. 
44 GABRIEL, supra note 22, at 217 (“[T]he requirements for avoidance under Article 72 are more 
stringent than those for suspension under Article 71, both as to the seriousness of the predicted breach and 
the probability that the breach will occur.”); LIU, supra note 12, at 270 (“[T]he consequences of the 
threatened breach need not be as serious under Article 71.”); Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 18 
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hedge terms like “arguably” and “presumably”45 and refer to the drafters’ use 
of two different articles and terms.46 This time the French versions of the 
terms, however, do not indicate, as they did in the context of “apparent” 
versus “clear,” a difference in the two statements.47 
                                                                                                                           
 
(“[T]he breach needs to be more ‘serious’ to trigger the more drastic remedy of avoidance of the contract 
(art. 72 CISG) rather than mere suspension of performance (art. 71 CISG).”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 
519 (The “separateness” of the two Articles can “provide for a party to suspend performance where the 
other party’s breach, while substantial, may not be a sufficiently fundamental to justify avoidance.” Id.); 
Eiselen, supra note 6, at 3 (“Suspension as provided for in Article 71 is less drastic in that it is only a 
temporary remedy . . . .”); Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 147 (explaining that the suspension standard is 
“to denote something less than a ‘fundamental breach’”). 
See also Flechtner, Remedies, supra note 35, at 94 (“It also appears that, compared to the 
requirements for avoidance under Article 72, the consequences of the threatened breach need not be as 
serious to trigger suspension under article 71.”). Flechtner subsequently tempered his views somewhat. 
See infra notes 46–47. See also SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 36, at 185 (“In practice the 
difference, however, the difference [sic] will not matter greatly.”). 
45 LIU, supra note 12, at 269 (“is presumably intended to denote something less than a ‘fundamental 
breach’”) & (Article 72 “arguably requires ‘a greater certainty’ than the ‘apparent’ test attached to the 
application of Art. 71.”); Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 5 (“seems to require”); Lookofsky, supra 
note 14, at 147 (“presumably intended to denote something less than a ‘fundamental breach’. . . .”). 
46 SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 92 (“Even though, in practice the difference 
between an (expected) violation of a ‘substantial part of the obligations’ . . . and a ‘fundamental breach’. . . 
will hardly be distinguishable, it must be assumed that such a differentiation is, in principle, possible: for 
one, the Egyptian motion to make the expectation of a ‘fundamental breach’ the prerequisite for 
suspending performance under Article 71(1) was rejected.”); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, 
COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 954 (“[T]he threshold in Article 71 is lower . . . . Otherwise, Article 
72, which allows for avoidance of the contract in cases of fundamental anticipatory breach, would be 
redundant.”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 519 (“The separateness of these two provisions is significant.”) 
(accord LIU, supra note 12, at 266); Saidov, supra note 26, at 888 (“The only guideline that can be inferred 
from the Convention itself is that an anticipated failure to perform ‘a substantial part of the obligations’ 
does not have to amount to a ‘fundamental breach’ as defined by Art. 25 and referred to in Art. 72.”). 
Professor Flechtner took the following initial position: “[T]he drafters would not have used two 
different phrases (‘fundamental breach’ as opposed to non-performance of ‘a substantial part of his 
obligations’), and in particular, two different adjectives describing the seriousness of the breach 
(‘fundamental’ as opposed to ‘substantial’), had they not intended to distinguish the seriousness of the 
threatened breach that would satisfy the standards of the respective articles.” Harry M. Flechtner, The 
Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and 
Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187, 190 (1998) [hereinafter 
Flechtner, Several Texts]. For an explanation of Flechtner’s discovery that this argument was at the least 
much harder to make under the French text, see infra note 47. 
47 See Flechtner, Several Texts, supra note 46, at 192 (“In the French version, both Article 71 and 
Article 72 use the same adjective to describe the seriousness of a threatened breach that would trigger 
their provisions. In both, the standard is a breach or non-performance that is ‘essentielle,’ i.e., Article 71 
states that, to justify suspension, a party must threaten non-performance of ‘une partie essentielle de ses 
obligations,’ and Article 72 requires a threat of ‘une contravention essentielle au contrat’ to warrant 
avoiding the contract.”). 
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Even though the drafters stated the applicable standards in two different 
sections and in different terms, close examination of the drafting of the 
provisions shows again that a distinction either does not exist or at most is 
quite narrow. The decisions for aggrieved parties is heightened further by the 
difficulty encountered in just trying to determine whether a breach is 
fundamental: “A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is 
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially 
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract.”48 The 
requirement for suspension under Article 71 is remarkably similar: “[I]t 
becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of 
his obligations.”49 The legitimate expectation of a contracting party is that 
the other party will perform the obligations undertaken in the contract. 
Article 25 (and thus Article 72 through its use of the defined term) and Article 
71 both refer to breaches that will lead to a substantial encroachment on those 
expectations. Thus, even though the stated standards in Articles 71 and 72 
use different terms, they are really the same. Article 72 applies Article 25 by 
using the defined term as the standard for avoidance, whereas Article 71 uses 
the essence of that definition as the requirement for suspension.50 
The case law does not provide much clarity. Several cases have found a 
right to suspend under circumstances in which the underlying impairment 
might easily have constituted a fundamental breach.51 These cases, of course, 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 CISG, supra note 1, art. 25 (emphasis added). 
49 Id. art. 71 (emphasis added). 
50 The workability of this approach is further undercut by the difficulty encountered in just trying 
to determine whether a breach is fundamental. Two commentators have noted this difficulty as follows: 
“The extent of injury that counts as a ‘substantial deprivation’ is not self-evident. . . . [T]he seriousness 
of breach is inevitably contestable in particular cases.” CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, THE 
UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
196 (2d ed. 2016). 
51 See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 6, 1996, 10 Ob 518/95, https://www.ris 
.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_19960206_OGH0002_0100OB00518_9500000_000/JJT_19960206_
OGH0002_0100OB00518_9500000_000.pdf (Austria) (because it was certain that the seller could not 
meet its obligation to deliver the goods, as it was unable to get approval from its supplier to export the 
liquid gas to Belgium, the buyer could suspend its procurement of a letter of credit); Rechtbanken van 
Koophandel [Kh.] [Commerce Tribunal] Hasselt, Mar. 1, 1995, No. A.R. 3641/94, http://unilex.info/cisg/ 
case/269 (Belg.) (discussing that payment for only a partial amount for goods delivered under the first 
order justified seller in suspending delivery of the goods in the second order); Mansonville Plastics (B.C.) 
Ltd. v. Kurtz GmbH, [2003] B.C.J. No. 1958 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (discussing the failure of a buyer to 
open a letter of credit); Oberlandesgericht [OLG Frankfurt] [Higher Regional Court] Oct. 6, 2004, 21 U 
24/04, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041006g1.html (Ger.) (explaining that a buyer’s failure to settle 
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are not helpful in drawing insights into when suspension is permitted in the 
absence of the satisfaction of the requirements of Article 72. Actually, the 
case law has not done much of anything to address this critical distinction. 
“Very few of the cases provide an insight into how the courts and tribunals 
are analyzing the matter of insecurity and prospective breach.”52 This 
inadequacy of the case law is easy to understand; the CISG is far too nebulous 
in articulating a meaningful distinction between suspension and avoidance. 
Like the buyers and sellers, the courts and tribunals have also been cut off 
from meaningful guidance. 
In conclusion, the CISG separates the remedies of suspension and 
avoidance into two different Articles, and those Articles state the 
requirements for the availability of each remedy through different wording. 
As subsection II.C.1 of this Paper demonstrates, however, even though most 
commentators conclude that the comparison of the standards governing the 
probability of future breach (whether the breach is “apparent” or “clear”) 
indicates that the Article 72 standard requires a higher degree of probability, 
close scrutiny of their statements shows that they all describe the Article 71 
standard as requiring nearly the same degree of high probability as in Article 
72. Furthermore, subsection II.C.2 of this Paper demonstrates that, although 
not recognized by most of the commentators, the provisions of the CISG 
themselves show that the requirements of both Articles concerning the 
seriousness of the breach require the essential aspects of a fundamental 
breach. The inescapable conclusion is that, despite forty years of attempts by 
scholars and tribunals to define or to distinguish the standards of Articles 71 
and 72, we are left with a distinction lacking a defined difference. The 
                                                                                                                           
 
its previous debts, and its refusal to do so, entitled the seller to hold back subsequent delivery); 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 27, 2007, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 
[IHR] 2008, 49–53 (Ger.) (explaining that a buyer’s declaration that it would not perform its duty to take 
delivery justified seller in suspending its obligation); Oberlandesgericht [OLG Hamm] [Higher Regional 
Court] June 23, 1998, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW], 1999, 785–87 (Ger.) 
(discussing an instance where a seller no longer possessed the goods covered by the contract); 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe, July 20, 2004, INTERNATIONALES 
HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 6/2004, 246–51 (Ger.) (discussing an instance where a buyer could not meet its 
delivery obligations because its supplier could only deliver the goods after the agreed upon delivery date); 
Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 
2013) (discussing a case where a seller was entitled to suspend its delivery performance after the buyer 
repudiated its obligation by wrongfully sending notices of cancellation). 
52 Walter, supra note 41, at 421. 
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linguistics of the two articles present a semantic non-conflict. The result of 
tying the same high standard to both articles precludes Article 71 suspension 
from being a remedy available to address lesser degrees of impairment. 
III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF ARTICLE 71 
A. General 
One of the basic underlying policies of the CISG is to keep deals 
together.53 Reflecting this objective, the CISG allows a sales contract to be 
terminated properly only under the most egregious circumstances. In cases 
of prospective impairment of expectations, the Convention implements this 
restrictive approach to termination by permitting avoidance of the contract 
only in cases of fundamental breach.54 
This policy is well founded, particularly in international sales 
transactions. The extensive differences in legal and political systems, 
business ethics, economic systems, language, and customs involved in 
domestic trade make misunderstandings and disputes significantly more 
probable in the international arena.55 In addition, they can cause heightened 
difficulties in minimizing transactional costs for a party that result from a 
breach of contract.56 For example, a seller that learns that its buyer, due to 
some defects in the delivered goods, has terminated the contract after the 
goods have arrived at a distant foreign destination can be placed in a very 
difficult position to protect its interests in the rejected goods. A seller with 
no agent or storage facilities in the buyer’s country, and little understanding 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 2, 13; Eiselen, supra note 6, at 2. 
54 Articles 47 and 63 establish the right to make a Nachfrist notice that extends the time for the 
breaching party to perform. If the performance is not forthcoming, the aggrieved party can avoid the 
contract. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b) & art. 64(1)(b). For further explanation, see supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. The CISG does not provide any comparable provisions with respect to prospective 
impairment cases. An aggrieved party then can avoid only when a forthcoming fundamental breach is 
clear. 
55 Schlechtriem, Calculation of Damages, supra note 6, at 1 (“The so-called anticipatory breach of 
contract occurs frequently in international commerce.”). 
56 For an economic analysis, see GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 50, at 5.06[1]. 
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of the market or culture of the buyer’s country, is at a major disadvantage in 
attempting to resell the goods there.57 
With avoidance available only for cases of fundamental breach, most 
parties with prospectively impaired expectations need an alternative, less 
onerous remedy. The need is particularly acute in international sales 
transactions. Consider a seller that receives information from a reliable 
source suggesting that financial setbacks to the buyer could impair the 
buyer’s ability to make payments for the goods. Obviously, the seller would 
like to resolve this issue satisfactorily before shipping the goods to a foreign 
land a considerable distance away. Alternatively, it might be the buyer that 
wants to hold off on making an advanced payment after comparable 
information suggests the seller might now lack the financial capacity to 
complete the manufacturing of the goods. When these types of cases do not 
reach the level of an anticipatory repudiation, an appropriate alternative 
protection for the aggrieved party is to allow that party to delay its own 
performance until the issue creating the impairment is resolved. Rather than 
avoiding the contract, the aggrieved party suspends the performance of the 
contract obligations. Clearly, between the two, avoidance is the significantly 
more drastic remedial response to an impairment. 
A comparison of the legal consequences that follow the assertion of 
either of these two remedies demonstrates their widely disparate natures. 
Successfully invoked, avoidance terminates the contract, thereby releasing 
both parties from any further obligations under the contract.58 The effect of a 
suspension is far less drastic. It simply allows an aggrieved party that has a 
contract performance coming due to delay its performance.59 For example, if 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Jacob Ziegel, The Remedial Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law 
Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 9–12 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit eds., 1984) (“It is a matter of 
balancing the buyer’s concern for predictability and certainty against the seller’s need for protection 
against contracts canceled on minor or capricious grounds, particularly where the goods have already been 
tendered to the buyer and there is no readily available alternative market or they can only be disposed of 
at great cost to the seller.”). 
58 CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1). See also CISG Chapter V, Section V on the effects of avoidance. 
Most of these provisions (Articles 81–84) address requirements of restitution following an avoidance. 
59 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 283 (“It is a logical condition for the suspension of 
performance of an obligation that the obligation to perform is already due. . . . What are required are not 
only acts of performance of the contract, but also those in preparation of performance which, therefore, 
can also be suspended.”); FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra 26, at 450–51 (“The CISG thus appears to be 
based on the general principle that, in the event of contracts that do not provide for simultaneous 
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a contract requires the buyer to pay in advance or to provide a letter of credit, 
sufficient impairment of the buyer’s expectations that the seller subsequently 
will perform its contract obligations should enable the buyer to delay going 
forward with its own performance. Similarly, if the seller’s expectations that 
the buyer will pay for the goods are sufficiently impaired, the seller could 
suspend by delaying its shipment of the goods.60 In either case, when the 
impairment is removed, the contract obligations of the suspending party 
resume.61 Unlike avoidance, suspension does not rupture the contractual 
relationship.62 
Just as the avoidance remedy allows an aggrieved party to terminate a 
contract without having to wait for a present breach to occur, a suspension 
                                                                                                                           
 
performance by both parties, the party bound to perform first deserves protection if it is likely that the 
other party will commit a breach of contract.”); LIU, supra note 12, at 272 (“Based on the anticipation of 
future breach by the other party of his obligation that is not yet due, the threatened party may suspend his 
own performance already due.”); SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 36, at 186 (“‘Suspension’ of the 
performance of the obligation means first and foremost the retention of the creditor’s own due 
performance, more exact: the retention of the performance which is necessary to fulfill the creditor’s part 
of the contract, for example, the delivery, the dispatch of the goods, the transfer of ownership, the payment 
of the purchase price, the taking of delivery.”); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra 
note 15, at 950 (“Article 71 emphasizes the principle of concurrent performance: a party should not be 
obliged to perform if it is sufficiently obvious that the promised counter-performance will not be rendered 
or not be conforming to the contract.”). 
60 Article 71(2) even allows an impaired seller under designated circumstances to stop the delivery 
of goods already in transit. A prerequisite to use of the provision is the seller must be able to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 71(1). For discussion of Article 71(2), see SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, 
COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 960–67. 
61 For discussion of this requirement, provided in Article 71(3), see infra notes 70–74 and 
accompanying text. 
62 Many cases have held that Article 71 does not provide a right to suspend with respect to a 
performance that is already due. See, e.g., Case No. 9448 of 1999, 2000 ICAB 103 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) 
(goods already delivered, no right to withhold payment for deliveries already completed); Hoven van 
Beroep (HvB) [Court of Appeal] Gent (Belg.), 26 April 2000, [BU B.A. S.P. v. S. Ltd.) (same); 
OBERLANDESGERICHT [Higher Regional Court] [OLG Dusseldorf], Nov. 18, 1993, 6 U 228/92, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/931118g1.html (Ger.); RB Utrecht, 18 juli 2007, 219436/ HA ZA 06-
2279, https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:BB0049 (Neth.) 
(Article 71 requires a prospective breach); Russia 24 May 2004 Arbitration proceeding 97/2004, PACE-
IICL CISG DATABASE, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/041223r1.html, n.3.4.1 (purchase price may not 
be withheld in case of defective delivery). 
See also SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 952 (“The non-
breaching party receiving defective delivery must fully perform its counter-obligation and is restricted to 
the remedies granted by Article 45, 61 [on present breach]. Metaphorically speaking, Article 71 can only 
be used as a sword, not as a shield: the creditor will be able to prevent performance of the contract by way 
of suspension but has no possibility to refuse its own performance if it has received defective 
performance.”). 
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permits a sufficiently impaired party to delay its performance rather than 
having to perform and subsequently seek a remedy if the offending party later 
commits the expected breach.63 Because suspension is so much less serious 
than avoidance, one would anticipate that the suspension remedy would be 
readily available over a much wider range of prospective impairments than 
coverage under the avoidance remedy. 
Article 71 does not preserve this distinction of the seriousness between 
avoidance and suspension. The CISG does provide for avoidance and 
suspension in separate articles dealing with impaired expectations, using 
different language with respect to each remedy. As the discussion in Part II 
of this Paper demonstrates, however, the standards articulated in Article 71 
undercut the availability of suspension as a separate remedy by pushing the 
requirements for its application to the level of what Article 72 requires for 
avoidance. For the most part, suspension is not an independent remedy based 
on criteria distinct from avoidance. 
Many commentators point to the far greater seriousness in the 
consequences of avoidance to explain why the drafters separated it and 
suspension into two different Articles.64 The argument is that the distinct 
legal consequences require two separate sections and standards in order to 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 “It [suspension] protects the creditor from knowingly exposing itself to the risk of not receiving 
anything in return for what it has performed.” SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra 
note 15, at 950. 
64 FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 26, at 456 (avoidance is “the more trenchant right”); GILLETTE 
& WALT, supra note 50, at 5–29 (“[T]he function of Article 71 as a means of generating information 
implies that an apparent failure to perform a ‘substantial part’ of one’s obligation need not amount to an 
apparent ‘fundamental breach.’”); JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALE UNDER 
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 552 (Harry M. Fletchner ed., 4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
HONNOLD, 4th ed.] (“This differing language means that greater certainty of future performance is 
required in order to justify final avoidance of the contract under article 72 than is required for the less 
radical remedy of suspension under Article 71.”); LIU, supra note 12, at 270 (“[T]he consequences of the 
threatened breach need not be as serious to trigger suspension under Article 71.”); SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-
CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 95 (“To some extent, differences in the standards of certainty were 
accepted and justified on the grounds that the remedy in Article 71 differs in seriousness from the remedy 
in Article 72(1).”); Eiselen, supra note 6, at 3 (“[T]he majority seems to be that Art. 72 requires a higher 
standard of prospective certainty than Art. 71(1) mainly due to the more drastic nature of the remedy 
under Art. 72(1), namely avoidance.”); Strub, supra note 26, at 497 (“The committee settled on ‘it appears’ 
in preference to ‘it is clear’ because of its intention that the criterion entitling a party suspension be less 
stringent than that of avoidance since suspension was the less severe remedy.”); “Both articles [71 & 72] 
are concerned with predicting whether there will be a breach, but the preconditions for the more drastic 
remedy of avoidance are more stringent than those for suspension, both as to the seriousness of the 
predicted breach and the probability that the breach will occur.” UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 4, at 336. 
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tailor each remedy to reflect the degree of seriousness of each of them. 
Articles 71 and 72 indeed do suggest the form of two independent remedies, 
but the substance of the two articles does not support that result. As the 
discussion in Part II of this paper shows, the fundamental breach requirement 
in Article 72 (defined in Article 25) necessitates a showing of substantial 
deprivation to the aggrieved party of its contractual expectation. The 
requirement for suspension in Article 71 simply states the content of the 
definition of fundamental breach: a demonstration that “the other party will 
not perform a substantial part of his obligations,” i.e., precisely the basis of 
the aggrieved party’s contract expectations.65 Article 71 cannot meet the 
objective of providing a separate remedy for cases of less serious 
consequences by limiting its availability to criteria comparable to what is 
required for the more serious remedy of avoidance. 
Since Article 71 basically makes suspension available only when a 
fundamental breach is clear, it thereby reduces suspension to simply a lesser 
response available for an aggrieved party that qualifies to avoid the 
contract.66 As a result, suspension under the CISG is pretty much limited only 
to cases that also support avoidance as the remedy of last resort. Suspension 
under Article 71 essentially is just an alternative remedy to avoidance under 
Article 72 for fundamental breach.67 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1). 
66 Some commentators observe that if the aggrieved party is in doubt as to whether the other party’s 
impairment rises to the level of fundamental breach, the safer approach is to invoke the right of suspension 
instead. See HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 426 (“[I]f grounds for avoidance are not 
clear, the aggrieved party will prefer a less drastic approach such as suspension of its own performance.”); 
LIU, supra note 12, at 294 (“[I]t remains advisable for the threatened party to decide to wait and first 
suspend the performance, especially when there are still doubts as to the seriousness of the conditions 
impeding performance.”); Eiselen, supra note 6, at 3 (“It is the safer option because the giving of notice 
of avoidance in terms of Article 72(2) under circumstances in where it is not warranted may in itself 
constitute an anticipatory breach entitling the other party to avoid the contract.”). 
Because both remedies end up applying the same rigid standard, this advice misses the mark, as 
does the contention that Article 71 is broader in scope than Article 72. See LIU, supra note 12, at 270 
(“very broad”); Strub, supra note 26, at 496 (“The final assessment of the right to suspend is that it is very 
broad.”); Vilus, supra note 26, at 242 (“The provisions [of Art. 71] give rather broad power.”); Ziegel, 
supra note 57, at 9–33 (“[T]he right to suspend conferred by Art. 71 is a very broad one.”). 
67 See Yang, supra note 35, at 2 (“If the assertion of suspension required the same degree of 
likelihood of a breach, the procedure becomes practically meaningless.”). 
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B. Notice and Adequate Assurances 
A comparison of Article 71 with UCC Section 2-609 is helpful, not for 
the purpose of advocating the adoption of the UCC provisions into the CISG, 
but rather to illustrate the degree of flexibility and expansive application 
possible with respect to suspension as a remedy for prospective impairment 
of expectations. An aggrieved party under the UCC invokes the section 2-
609 right to suspend by making a demand for adequate assurances of 
performance from the other party.68 The rationale is that the other party is 
thereby notified that it has impaired expectations of the aggrieved party and 
must now clear up the impairment through sufficient reassurances in order to 
reinstate the aggrieved party’s contract obligations. If those assurances are 
forthcoming, the party that suspended is no longer impaired and must end its 
suspension by going forward with its performance.69 
Article 71 also references adequate assurances. A party that suspends its 
performance must immediately thereafter provide notice to the other party.70 
The purpose of this provision is also to make the recipient aware of its alleged 
transgression and to give the recipient an opportunity to provide assurances 
sufficient to alleviate the impairment.71 The suspending party then “must 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
69 Id. (stating, “[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of 
either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives 
such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already 
received the agreed return”). 
70 “A party suspending performance, whether before or after dispatch of the goods, must 
immediately give notice of the suspension to the other party . . . .” CISG supra note 1, art. 71(3). See also 
Award No. CISG/1989/02 (China Int’l Econ. and Trade Arb. Comm. 1989) (no notice of suspension or 
avoidance); LANDGERICHT [LG] [Regional Court] Darmstadt, May 29, 2001, 4 O 101/00, http://cisgw3 
.law.pace.edu/cases/010529g1.html (Ger.) (buyer sent a notice of complaint, but failed to give notice of 
suspension); Amtsgericht [AG] [District Court] Frankfurt, Jan. 31, 1991, 32 C 1074/90-41, CLOUT No. 
51, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910131g1.html (Ger.) (failure to give immediate notice of 
suspending delivery opened seller to damages); Case No. 2319 of 2002, Arbitral Award (Neth. Arb. Inst.), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n1.html (suspension of future deliveries under the contract due 
to non-conformity of the first consignments). 
71 Case law holds that a failure of the suspending party to provide notice deprives it of the right to 
rely upon its suspension. Case No. 8574 of 1996, 2-2000 ICAB 57 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) (purchase of goods 
in substitution for the goods under contract did not suspend buyer’s obligations); Amtsgericht [AG] 
[District Court Frankfurt], Jan. 31, 1991, 32 C 1074/90-41, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910131g1 
.html (Ger.) (notice held to be an absolute necessary prerequisite for the right to suspend); Landgericht 
[LG] [Regional Court] Stendal, Oct. 12, 2000, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR]: ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR DIE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHE PRAXIS 30–34, Feb. 2001 (Ger.) (requirement to give notice not 
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continue with performance if the other party provides adequate assurance of 
his performance.”72 Article 72 provides a comparable opportunity for the 
impairing party to provide adequate assurances73 to end the effectiveness of 
a notice of avoidance.74 
Giving an impairing party the opportunity to provide adequate 
assurances often can open an effective way to address the concerns of an 
aggrieved party and overcome obstacles to both parties proceeding with their 
contract performance. Unfortunately, the drafting of Article 71 restricts its 
availability in ways that do not allow for access to the benefits that could 
result from the role of adequate assurances. Consider how the use of adequate 
assurances by an alleged offending party can clarify a misunderstanding of 
the suspending party. The latter party might be mistaken in its concerns or 
have an exaggerated level of apprehension that might be alleviated with a 
simple reassurance from knowledgeable parties. Adequate assurances can 
work this way, and they often do under approaches like UCC Section 2-609. 
The problem under the CISG is that the aggrieved party’s right to invoke the 
opportunity for adequate assurances under Article 71(3) is not available 
unless the aggrieved party can first satisfy the exceptionally high standard 
for the availability of the right to suspend stated in Article 71(1).75 A simple 
misunderstanding will not often rise to the level of an apparent breach of a 
substantial part of a contract obligation. 
Rather than contesting the availability of the suspension process in such 
circumstances, the obvious practical approach, under even the CISG, would 
                                                                                                                           
 
satisfied by just failing to pay the purchase price); Russia 27 July 1999 Arbitration proceeding 302/1996, 
PACE-IICL CISG DATABASE, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990727r1.html (last updated Dec. 20, 
2006) (Article 71 not available because seller never notified buyer of the suspension due to buyer’s failure 
to obtain a letter of credit.). 
72 CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(3). 
73 The inclusion of provisions on notice and the opportunity to provide adequate assurances of 
performance further coalesces the requirements of Articles 71 and 72. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71 & 
art. 72. 
74 “[T]he party intending to declare the contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the other 
party in order to permit him to provide adequate assurance of his performance.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 
72(2). Article 72, however, includes two exceptions to the obligation to provide notice and give the other 
party the opportunity to provide assurances. The obligation applies only “[i]f time allows.” It has been 
pointed out that with modern methods of fast communication, this exception does not have very much 
effect. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 440. The second limitation is that notice and 
opportunity for assurances “do not apply if the other party has declared that he will not perform his 
obligations.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 72(3). The policy is that the declaration is definitive when compared 
to grounds of avoidance based on actions that make further performance impossible. 
75 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1). See also infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
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simply be to provide the assurances when they can so easily overcome the 
misunderstanding. Many other cases, however, are not so simplistic. The 
impairing party may choose not to provide assurances, but rather ignore the 
notice of impairment or attack the propriety of the suspension itself. In these 
circumstances, the failure to provide adequate assurances will not justify the 
continuation of the suspension unless suspension was appropriate under 
Article 71(1). If the suspension was not justified because it was not founded 
on both the requisite probability of a breach and seriousness of the breach, 
the refusal to provide adequate assurances for any impairment that the 
aggrieved party claims does not have any legal consequences to the other 
party. That impairing party simply takes the position that the suspension was 
ill-founded and that Article 71 consequently imposes no obligation to 
respond with assurances. If that position of the alleged offender is accurate, 
the aggrieved party will have breached its contract obligations by suspending 
rather than performing and, if serious enough, the breach might even be 
fundamental.76 The opportunity for successful circumvention of providing 
assurances in these cases is greatly enhanced by the excessively high 
requirements to have a right to suspend in the first place. 
Consider a strike by its employees before the seller has begun or finished 
manufacturing the goods to be delivered under the contract. Arguably, the 
buyer could then suspend by withholding a prepayment, delaying its 
procurement of a letter of credit, or holding off on preliminary steps like 
making shipping arrangements. The rub is that the aggrieved party can 
suspend its performance in such a contract only if, because of the strike, “it 
becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of 
his obligations as a result thereof.”77 The inability of an aggrieved party to 
assess either the duration of the strike or how it will affect the seller’s ability 
to deliver often will pose an insurmountable burden to meet the Article 71(1) 
tests. 
Even more tenuous might be the circulation of information that could 
affect either party.78 Indications of possible export controls, prospective 
legislative and administrative measures, impending bankruptcy, or numerous 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 16. 
77 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1). 
78 Yang, supra note 35, at 6 (“Among business people in the same industry, rumour usually spreads 
quickly of trouble, or rumours of trouble, at a particular firm.”). 
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other possible complicating factors could cause great concern to a contracting 
party required to commit resources to its performance.79 The illustrative 
effects of all of these examples are, of course, highly dependent on the 
underlying facts of each case. The point here is only to highlight that a 
contracting party can face an insurmountable burden to establish that an 
event, rumor, or information received shows that it has “become apparent 
that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations.”80 
Given the drafting of the provisions,81 the CISG arguably provides an 
offending party an opportunity to remove the impairment, but does not 
thereby give the aggrieved party a right to demand assurances of 
performance. The issue concerning demand is largely irrelevant in light of 
the failure of the CISG to articulate any legal consequences for a failure of 
an impairing party to provide assurances, whether by foregoing the 
opportunity to provide assurances or by ignoring an actual demand for 
assurances. As the discussion below shows, the important issue posed centers 
on the consequences of not providing adequate assurances.82 
Section 2-609(4) is a provision in the UCC that deals with the situation 
when adequate assurances demanded by the aggrieved party are not 
forthcoming: “After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a 
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due performance 
as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation 
of the contract.”83 The impairing party thus cannot evade substantial 
consequences from a suspension simply by ignoring the demand or by 
providing insufficient assurances, because the UCC provision then escalates 
the case into one for avoidance of the contract. 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 Some of these types of events might be sufficient to invoke Article 79 on excuse due to 
unanticipated circumstances. This approach would provide an excuse from performing, and thus, unlike 
suspension, end the contractual relationship. 
80 CISG, supra note 1, art. 71(1). Saidov, supra note 26, at 895 (Due to the requirement of a very 
high degree of likelihood imposed under the Article 71 standard, “[t]his probably means that a [sic] even 
a well-founded suspicion is unlikely to be sufficient.”). See also FERRARI & TORSELLO, supra note 26, at 
457 (“Mere suspicion, even if well-founded, is therefore not enough.”). 
81 Article 71(3) provides that after a notice of suspension, the suspending party “must continue with 
performance if the other party provides adequate assurance of his performance.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 
71(3). Article 72(2) requires notice of avoidance to the other party “in order to permit him to provide 
adequate assurance of his performance.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 72(2). 
82 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
83 See UCC § 2-609(4) (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
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Article 71, in contrast, does not articulate any consequences to an 
impairing party that does not take advantage of the opportunity to provide 
assurances, other than to allow the suspension to continue. With any 
impairments that fall short of fundamental breach, Article 71 does not 
escalate the impairment into a repudiation.84 Only if the impairment is 
sufficient enough to constitute a fundamental breach can an aggrieved party 
proceed to avoid the contract under Article 72.85 
So where does this leave the aggrieved party that has been subjected to 
an impairment that does not rise to the level of a fundamental breach? At 
best, this approach allows the impaired party to delay its performance while 
it waits to see if the other party maintains its position until its breach becomes 
a present breach.86 At worst, if the position of some commentators arguing 
that a suspension can only remain for a reasonable time is correct,87 the right 
of suspension is only a right for the impaired party to withhold its 
                                                                                                                           
 
84 Flechtner, Remedies, supra note 35, at 93 (“Article 71 does not permit a party to treat the contract 
as repudiated if the other side fails to provide adequate assurances.”). But see SCHLECHTRIEM & 
SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 966: “[M]ore convincing is the view that the debtor’s 
non-providing of an adequate assurance amounts to an anticipatory fundamental breach of contract which 
entitles the creditor to avoid the contract (Article 72(3)).” 
85 “The failure by a party to give adequate assurance that he will perform when properly requested 
to do so under [Draft] article 63(2) [counterpart of the current art. 71(3)] may help make it ‘clear’ that he 
will commit a fundamental breach.” Secretariat Commentary No. 2 on Article 63 of the 1978 Draft 
(emphasis added), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 443. 
86 Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Stendal, Oct. 12, 2000, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 
[IHR]: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTLICHE PRAXIS 30–34, Feb. 2001 (Ger.) (“The 
entitlement to suspend performance remains until the [anticipatory] breach ceases to exist, until the other 
party commits a fundamental breach of contract, or until the other party provides adequate assurances of 
performance under Art. 71(3).”); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 289 (may “wait until the time 
for performance has passed”); SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY 2d, supra note 5, at 531 (“If assurance is 
not given, the right of suspension continues.”); Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 17 (“[T]he obligation 
to perform may remain suspended only until the other party performs his obligations, until this party 
provides adequate assurance of performance of his obligation, until the first party declares the contract 
avoided (if the conditions of arts. 72, 49 or 64 CISG are met), . . . or until the period of limitation 
applicable to the contract has expired.”). 
87 Drawing upon Professor Honnold’s observation that “[c]ontinued suspension of performance is 
closely akin to avoidance of the contract,” Professor Flechtner notes that “[p]ermitting indefinite 
suspension where the threatened breach is not fundamental . . ., would undermine Article 72.” Flechtner, 
Remedies, supra note 35, at 95 (quoting HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 398). “In other 
words, indefinite suspension of performance would relieve the suspending party of its executory duties 
under the contract, just as avoidance does.” Id. at 95 n.195. Accord Rowley, supra note 35, at 634 (quoting 
Flechtner). 
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performance temporarily, with no further basis to address further the 
impairment of expected performance. 
An alternative argument that has been advanced is the contention that 
when an offending party does not take advantage of its opportunity to provide 
adequate assurances under Article 71(3), the aggrieved party can treat that 
failure as a fundamental breach and avoid the contract.88 Most commentators, 
however, do not state the proposition that definitively89 and other authors 
flatly reject it.90 The text of the Article 71 provisions on assurances and the 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 14, at 289 (“If the other party provides no assurance, this 
can be seen as an indication of an anticipatory, fundamental breach of contract, and the party empowered 
to suspend performance of this obligations can avoid the contract under art. 72.”). The latest edition of a 
respected text presents a new argument based on a general principle derived from time limits in numerous 
provisions of the Convention: “Therefore, in order to correct the harsh result of Article 71, it seems 
adequate to apply a reasonable period within which the debtor must provide assurance and, if assurance 
is not provided in time, to allow for an avoidance of the contract.” SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, 
COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 964. 
89 HONNOLD, 4th ed., supra note 64, at 436 (“A party’s failure to provide adequate assurance of its 
performance after it has received notice that the other side has justifiably suspended its performance under 
Article 71 may make it ‘clear’ that the party will commit a fundamental breach, thus giving the other side 
the right to avoid under Article 72.”) (emphasis added); SCHWENZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 515 
(“Opinions are divided: while some hold that failure to provide adequate assurances automatically 
constitutes an anticipatory fundamental breach (Art. 72 CISG), others suggest that this is not necessarily 
the case and that it will depend on the existence of further elements to decide whether the requirements 
of Article 72 CISG are fulfilled.”); Bennett, supra note 6, at 523 (“Frequently, however, a failure to 
provide an adequate assurance will justify a conclusion that a fundamental breach will be committed and 
avoidance for anticipatory breach will be possible.”) (emphasis added); Eiselen, supra note 6, at 4 (right 
to avoid under these circumstances “is debatable”). 
90 Azeredo da Silveira, supra note 6, at 23 (“If the non-performing party fails to provide assurance 
of performance and the suspected breach is not of fundamental nature, the innocent party is only entitled 
to continue to suspend performance of the contract or of obligations that ought to be fulfilled in preparation 
of performance of the contract.”); J.W. Carter, Party Autonomy and Statutory Regulation: Sale of Goods, 
PACE-IICL CISG DATABASE (last updated July 11, 2001), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
carter2.html (“Surprisingly there is no statement of the consequences of an inadequate assurance, and it 
should not be presumed that the failure to provide an assurance (or an adequate assurance) is enough to 
make it ‘clear’ that the other party will commit a fundamental breach. A failure to provide an adequate 
assurance does not automatically provide a right of avoidance and there is therefore no mechanism by 
which a party may demand an assurance of performance and treat a failure to respond with an adequate 
assurance as a fundamental breach.”); Flechtner, Remedies, supra note 35, at 93 (“Article 71 does not 
permit a party to treat the contract as repudiated if the others side fails to provide adequate assurances.”); 
Saidov, supra note 26, at 913 (“[T]he question of whether the suspending party has a right to avoid the 
contract is to be resolved solely to those [Art. 72] conditions.”); Strub, supra note 26, at 497–98 (“[T]he 
refusal to provide adequate assurances ‘should not in itself be regarded as “clear” evidence of an 
impending breach of contract.’”) (quoting SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 96). 
Professor Schlechtriem previously took this position: see SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY 2d, supra note 
5, at 531 (“Whether or not a failure to provide adequate assurance after proper notice from the innocent 
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comments in the Commentary of the Secretariat91 clearly do not support an 
automatic right to avoid whenever adequate assurances are not provided 
under Article 71(3). 
The biggest problems with CISG Article 71 are its use of the term 
“becomes apparent” as the degree of necessary certainty of a breach and its 
use of the concepts of the definition of “fundamental breach” to state the 
required seriousness of the impairment of both suspension and avoidance.92 
Part II of this Paper demonstrates that this drafting radically restricts the 
availability of suspension as a remedy against impairments of expectations 
that do not rise to the level of fundamental breach. Despite the dilemma faced 
by many contracting parties in international sales transactions, they are 
denied a remedy for these impairments and must proceed with their 
performances even in the face of some strong doubts about whether the other 
party can or will perform. 
Compared to Article 71, UCC Section 2-609 provides a much more 
generous opportunity to utilize the suspension remedy by using a standard 
for suspension that is considerably easier to satisfy than the standard for 
avoidance. In order to cancel the contract (avoidance under the CISG) due to 
an anticipated breach under UCC Section 2-610, the aggrieved party must 
establish a loss “which will substantially impair the value of the contract to 
[it].”93 Suspension, on the other hand, is available in many cases of doubt as 
to whether performance by the other party subsequently will be forthcoming. 
A concerned party can initiate the suspension process “[w]hen reasonable 
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of the [other] 
party.”94 
                                                                                                                           
 
party already satisfies the requirements of Article 72 is a matter of dispute. The question should be 
answered solely by reference to the criteria in that article.”). For a statement of his more recent position, 
see SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY 3d, supra note 15, at 964. 
91 “The failure by a party to give adequate assurance that he will perform when properly requested 
to do so under [Draft] article 63(2) [counterpart of the current art. 71(3)] may help make it ‘clear’ that he 
will commit a fundamental breach.” Secretariat Commentary No. 2 on Article 63 of the 1978 Draft 
(emphasis added), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 443. 
92 See supra notes 23–52 and accompanying text. 
93 The concept of anticipatory repudiation in the UCC correlates strongly with CISG Article 72 and 
reflects the comparable bright-line test for determining the substantial impairment sufficient to justify 
cancellation of the contract. UCC § 2-610 (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
94 UCC § 2-609(1) (AM. L. INT. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020). 
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Issues remain under Section 2-609 on how low a threshold will still be 
considered appropriate to constitute such reasonable grounds. This 
uncertainty is inevitable with a concept like suspension which is so fact-
dependent. Guiding principles in such cases thus must be general. What is 
certain is that the floor on availability of UCC suspension is far lower that it 
is under the CISG. Despite its use of terms that appear to create distinct 
general standards of flexibility, the CISG in reality puts the floor on the 
availability of suspension on the doorstep of fundamental breach.95 
C. The Drafting Process and Developing Nations 
The process that led to the adoption of CISG Article 71 was very 
unfortunate.96 The UNCITRAL draft of the Article presented to the delegates 
at the Vienna Convention authorized suspension when the aggrieved party 
had “good grounds to conclude that the other party will not perform a 
substantial part of his obligations.”97 Thus, the delegates started their 
deliberations with the unfortunate use of the concepts stated in the definition 
of “fundamental breach” as the basis to determine the required seriousness 
of the impairment for suspension to occur.98 
The debate at the Convention then led to further derailment of 
suspension as a viable remedy under the CISG. The end result was the 
adoption of the “becomes apparent” standard in a purported attempt to make 
prior drafts of the requirement more objective. The concern for greater 
objectivity is curious in light of the prior drafting history. The original 
drafting derived from ULIS Article 73,99 which required “good reason to fear 
that [the other party] will not perform a material part of his obligations.”100 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 Yang, supra note 35, at 2 (“If the assertion of suspension required the same degree of likelihood 
of a breach, the procedure becomes practically meaningless.”). 
96 See Bennett, supra note 6, at 513–18 (discussing the legislative history of CISG Article 71). 
97 HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 389. 
98 See supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
99 UNIDROIT Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, art. 73, 
July 1, 1964 (demonstrating ULIS was the end product of the initial effort to develop an international law 
on sales of goods but it was never widely adopted by many nation states). 
100 U.N. Secretary-General, Issues Presented by Chapters IV to VI of the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods, V Yearbook 80–94, U.N. Doc. A(8) A/CN.9/87, Annex IV (1974), in 
HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 183. 
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The Working Group,101 at its fifth session in 1974, substituted the term 
“reasonable grounds to conclude that the other party will not perform a 
substantial part of his obligations.”102 Either of these two prior drafts would 
appear to provide a more objective standard than “becomes apparent” 
because the terms they used are more commonly associated with objective 
criteria.103 The end result was the adoption of the “becomes apparent” 
standard in a purported attempt to make prior drafts on the requirement on 
certainty of breach more objective.104 
This change was instigated in part by another issue that concerned many 
delegates with respect to Article 71. The use of the term “apparent” was to 
make it clear that suspension could not apply to conditions that the other party 
knew existed at the time of contract formation.105 Professor Schlechtriem has 
stated the objective succinctly: “The aim of the proposal that led to the 
present formulation was to permit a suspension of performance even when 
the circumstances that made the obligor’s performance doubtful had existed 
before, but had not become apparent until after the conclusion of the 
contract.”106 
The change to Article 71 can also be traced to adamant resistance of the 
developing nations to the draft presented to the delegates at the Vienna 
Convention. “From the developing countries’ perspective, the anticipatory 
repudiation provisions reinforce their weaker bargaining power in the 
international trade setting.”107 Viewing the drafted provisions as subjective, 
                                                                                                                           
 
101 See Working Paper on the Hague Conventions of 1964, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 
Working Grp. on Sales, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.2 (1970) (illustrating that the Working Group was 
composed of representatives of several nations that addressed provisions of ULIS in an effort to develop 
a revised draft of a law on international sales of goods). 
102 Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Int’l Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/87, Annex I-IV (Jan. 1974), in HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 184. 
103 CISG, supra note 1 (illustrating that the CISG itself uses the term “reasonable” or words derived 
from the term, such as “not unreasonable,” in at least 22 of its Articles). 
104 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 428. 
105 See, e.g., BUNDESGERICHT [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 17, 2007, 4C.94/2006 (Switz.) 
(holding that seller could not suspend its deliveries based on an outstanding unpaid debt of over $7 million 
of which it was aware before entering into the contract); Bennett, supra note 6, at 515–16; Enderlein & 
Maskow, supra note 14, at 284. 
106 SCHLECHTRIEM, UN-CONVENTION, supra note 10, at 91; see BUNDESGERICHT [BGer], July 17, 
2007 4C.94/2006 (Switz.) (holding that seller did not substantiate its claim that the creditworthiness of 
the buyer had deteriorated after the conclusion of the contract). 
107 Strub, supra note 26, at 477 (discussing the concerns of the developing nations); see also Saidov, 
supra note 26, at 884 (“It has been suggested that not only is there greater room for abuse (for the 
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they argued that suspension could be used to abuse trading parties from 
developing nations by exploiting less stable economic and political 
conditions in some developing nations.108 They reinforced this claim by 
pointing out that these conditions could themselves facilitate the unjust 
escape of contracting partners simply through appearances of instability.109 
The developing nations proposed consolidating the concepts of suspension 
and avoidance into one section in order to apply the “it is clear” objective 
language to both concepts.110 An ad hoc Working Group addressed the 
differences among the delegates.111 This group adopted the current wording 
of Article 71 as a compromise solution, partly because of concerns that 
without a compromise, several developing nations might resist the adoption 
of the entire Convention.112 
Another aspect of the developing-nation resistance to Article 71 was that 
they simply did not understand the remedy of suspension.113 By the time of 
the adoption of the CISG, the concept of suspension of performance was well 
known among many developed nations of the West, but was largely unknown 
in developing countries.114 Uncertainty about the concept itself thus 
contributed to the level of resistance to Article 71.115 The ultimate disservice 
in this area to the developing nations was to draft the suspension remedy in 
a way that tends to heighten that uncertainty rather than alleviate it. 
If the poor drafting had been cleaned up, the decision of the developing 
nations to resist a suspension remedy in the CISG would have been short-
                                                                                                                           
 
conditions of economic and political instability, which may be present in some such countries, may create 
an appearance of instability) but also the consequences of exercising the remedies may impose harsher 
consequences on business persons from developing countries where, for example, there may be particular 
difficulties with communication or storage facilities.”). 
108 Strub, supra note 26, at 476. 
109 Id. at 476–77. 
110 U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Proposals and Amendments 
Submitted In the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.252, reprinted in HONNOLD, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at ¶ 14, 702. See also Strub, supra note 26, at 491. 
111 HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 16, at 702. See also Strub, supra note 26, at 
491. 
112 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW 3d, supra note 14, at 429. 
113 Strub, supra note 26, at 476–77. 
114 Id. at 476. 
115 Id. at 475. 
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sighted with respect to the interests of their own merchants.116 Remedies for 
insecurity are not beneficial only to developed nations in their sales 
transactions with developing countries. Suspension is a self-help remedy 
equally available to all of the contracting parties. International sales 
transactions between developed and developing countries pose a particularly 
fertile ground for an expansive availability of suspension. With the potential 
for greater disparity posed in their experiences in world trade, in their 
understanding of commercial complexities, and in their need to address 
differing appearances, the likelihood of misconceptions between the parties 
becomes magnified substantially. A more readily available self-help remedy 
of suspension for these contracting parties and all other parties in 
international sales contracts would enable them to call a pause to further 
performance in light of prospective impairments.117 The only other options 
are for an impaired party (from a developed or a non-developed nation) to 
proceed with its own performance or to make the more drastic decision to 
provide notice of an intent to avoid the contract. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Suspension and avoidance are self-help remedies. The party feeling 
aggrieved does not seek relief through judicial action or arbitration. It has to 
make its decision on whether to suspend or avoid, and thus whether to take 
the risk of a subsequent challenge in a court or before an arbitrator. The 
consequences of the decision are particularly high under self-help because, if 
the remedy is implemented when it does not apply, the aggrieved party itself 
breaches by not proceeding with its performance, and that breach might be 
determined to be fundamental.118 A party feeling impaired about the other 
party’s ability or willingness to perform really needs guidance in selecting its 
option. 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 See id. at 478 (“[T]he developing countries’ opposition to the suspension provision was perhaps 
unwarranted; the provision in fact is fairly protective of the repudiator.”). 
117 An important area where the developing nations had a major impact on the final drafts of the 
impairment provisions of the CISG was the addition of the notice requirements in Articles 71 and 72. In 
the context of suspension, the requirement of prompt notice of suspension and the right to provide 
adequate assurances of performance give all parties a basis to demonstrate that the appearances to the 
other party are not as they appear or to correct the impairment. 
118 “If the suspension is not rightful, however, the suspending party will have breached the contract 
when that party fails to perform its obligations.” GABRIEL, supra note 22, at 214. 
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With avoidance tightly constrained as a remedy of last resort, 
contracting parties need a viable alternative to use as a lesser response to 
prospective impairment than avoidance. Parties in contracts under the CISG 
are ill-served in this regard. Although the CISG provides a remedy of 
suspension, it restrictively constrains its availability to cases at or nearly the 
same as the avoidance remedy of last resort. The policies generally 
recognized as underlying workable suspension are not reflected in the 
drafting of Article 71. 
Many commentators on this subject appropriately turn to ascertaining 
the underlying intent of the drafters to find a difference between CISG 
suspension and avoidance. They tend, however, simply to infer that the 
drafters intended a difference in the requirements between suspension and 
avoidance because of the division of the two subjects into two separate 
Articles with different terms and because avoidance is conceptually 
recognized as a more serious remedy. They provide little assistance to parties 
engaged in international sales transactions. For the most part, their analysis 
ultimately supports my argument that whatever differences exist between 
Articles 71 and 72 are extremely narrow.119 Applying conclusions based on 
traditional policies to a subject do not work well when the statutory language 
itself indicates a strong a movement away from tradition. A legal advisor in 
international sales consequently should be very conservative in 
recommending suspension in cases in which the availability of avoidance 
under Article 72 is questionable. 
The case law applying CISG Articles 71 and 72 also does not provide 
sufficient guidance for parties to make their decisions on whether or not to 
suspend performance. The case law is far from consistent. Another 
commentator has noted that less than forty cases included in the UNCITRAL 
Digest address the legal terms in Articles 71 and 72, with many of the cases 
mere dicta.120 
Very little of the current state of the law regarding suspension under 
Article 71 provides strong support for the reasoning that suspension is 
available as a lesser alternative remedy for parties that cannot qualify for 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 Professor Fletchner has referred to “the clumsy fit between Articles 71 and 72, which were the 
subject of last-minute debate and tinkering at the Vienna diplomatic conference.” Fletchner, Remedies, 
supra note 35, at 93–94 n.190. The intent of the drafters with respect to Article 71 appears to have been 
lost in the process. 
120 Walter, supra note 41, at 422. 
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avoidance. Admittedly, suspension is an area of the law not easily 
determined. Factual circumstances in individual cases are critical. The 
problem with CISG Article 71 as an alternative remedy to avoidance is that 
it sets the floor of the threshold for suspension so high that it radically 
constrains its availability. The Article should have been drafted in a manner 
that would have loosened these constraints considerably to remove much of 
the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies the concept of suspension. 
Contracting parties and their advisors need much better signals about 
insecurities that qualify under Article 71, even though the insecurities would 
not constitute a basis for Article 72 avoidance. This deficiency of the drafting 
of Article 71 prevents suspension under the CISG from serving as a viable 
working remedy in actual practice. 
As has already been noted in this same context,121 advancing an 
argument that Article 71 should be amended is naive in the context of the 
reality with the CISG. Contracting parties and practitioners thus must 
consider ways to lessen the uncertainty and risk associated with CISG Article 
71. These responses basically must occur at the contract formation stage. 
One approach is to utilize Article 6, which allow allows parties to agree 
to derogate from specific provisions of the CISG. Reflecting the principle of 
freedom of contract, the parties can agree in advance on how they will handle 
a self-help remedy of suspension.122 They could identify potential areas in 
which either party would feel insecure with respect to the other party’s ability 
and willingness to perform their contract. Because a need to suspend depends 
upon how future events unfold after the parties form their contract and before 
its performance, the advantages to both buyers and sellers of clarifying 
suspension rights should make this approach amenable to both. Their 
agreement could be tailored to issues that have arisen in previous contracts 
like their own.123 
Another response would be to eliminate much of the risk associated with 
circumstances that could pose issues concerning suspension. Full-blown 
documentary transactions that use irrevocable letters of credit illustrate this 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 Seliazniova, supra note 18, at 137. 
122 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Köln, Jan. 8, 1997, 27 U 58/96, CLOUT No. 
311, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970108g1.html (Ger.) (seller that agreed to derogate from Article 
71 could not subsequently use it to suspend its obligation to redeliver goods when the buyer failed to pay 
past debts). 
123 For assistance on drafting, see Walter, supra note 41, at 422–27. 
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approach. When the contracting parties do not deal face-to-face, the concern 
of the seller is to get paid before losing control of the goods. The irrevocable 
letter of credit resolves this concern directly by enabling the seller to be paid 
by its bank upon delivery of all of the required documents. The goods will 
already have been loaded on the carrier, but shipment pursuant to a negotiable 
bill of lading leaves the seller in control of the goods until it receives payment 
in exchange for the bill of lading, along with the other required documents. 
The buyer’s concern is about paying for the goods before determining 
whether they conform to the terms of the contract, which is exactly what 
happens when the seller’s bank pays the seller under the bank’s confirmation 
of the letter of credit. The buyer can protect itself by insisting on a right to 
have its agent inspect the goods as they are prepared for shipment. If the 
seller then cannot provide, as part of the documents required to be presented 
to the confirming bank, an authentication from the inspector that the goods 
conform, the confirming bank should not pay the seller and the seller has no 
inherent advantage. 
The experience of academics and tribunals with the suspension remedy 
vividly reveals the significance of the deficiencies in the drafting of CISG 
Article 71. Hopefully, the suggestions provided here can help lessen the 
harm. 
